Many theoretical studies suggest that retailers co-locate with rivals in order to take advantage of economies of agglomeration when consumers have limited information, even though co-location implies fiercer price competition. We present an empirical model of consumer search for spatially differentiated products and retail competition that captures these two forces. We estimate the model using detailed data on new car transactions. The results suggest that search frictions contribute about $422 to the the average retail price of a car. We use the model to separately disentangle the competition and agglomeration effects of retail co-location by simulating retail closures. A full information model that ignores the agglomeration effect would overstate the gains to incumbent rivals and the welfare loss to consumers due to car dealer closures.
Introduction
Economists have long sought to understand the location decisions of firms and these decisions' effect on industry profits and consumer welfare. There has been special attention paid to why some firms tend to locate near each other even though this would tend to imply greater price competition. 1
The co-location of firms is especially ubiquitous in many retail industries. A classic explanation for the co-location of retail stores has to do with limited consumer information, see Stahl (1982) and Wolinsky (1983) . The basic idea is that if consumers must engage in costly search in order to resolve informational problems before purchase, then consumers are more likely to search areas where there is a concentration of stores in order to limit search costs. This agglomeration effect encourages co-location of stores. However, if stores are close to each other then price competition may be fierce, potentially outweighing benefits to stores from co-location. 2 The first goal of this paper is to quantify the agglomeration and competition effects of retail co-location and to evaluate how much of these effects are related to limited consumer information.
Understanding the agglomeration and competition effects of co-location has important implications for evaluating the consequences of retail closures. On the one hand, the agglomeration effect implies that a nearby rival's exit would reduce the total attraction of that geographic area and force the incumbent firms to lower their prices in order to continue attracting searching consumers.
This would decrease the surplus of incumbent firms and potentially increase consumer welfare. On the other hand, the competition effect implies that a nearby rival's exit would increase the market power of incumbent firms and lead to higher prices. This would increase the surplus of incumbent firms and reduce consumer welfare. The agglomerative effects of retail closures is particularly salient given the recent U.S. financial crisis of 2007-2009 that saw many retail firm exits due to bankruptcy and other financial issues. For example, Benmelech et al. (2014) document massive retail exits due to financial reasons, such as bankruptcy, during the financial crisis, and estimate a negative effect of closures on incumbent firms. Therefore, the second goal of this paper is to evaluate the welfare effects of retail closures.
To accomplish these two goals, we estimate a model of consumer search for spatially differentiated products in the new car retail industry. This is an ideal setting to examine issues of retail co-location for two reasons. First, retail co-location is ubiquitous in this industry. For example, Figure 1 shows that about 90% of car dealers are located within one-half mile of a competitor in the U.S. state of Virginia, where the data we use come from. Second, this industry has been the setting of massive retail closures over the past half century, which was only exacerbated by the recent financial crisis.
The model we present is a parametric version of the optimal portfolio choice problem described 1 For example, Hotelling (1929) studied the location decisions of firms selling to geographically disperse consumers and how these decisions influence consumer substitution across products and geography in an attempt to explain the co-location of firms. However, d 'Aspremont et al. (1979) showed that Hotelling's principle of minimum differentiation was invalid and suggested that firms would want to locate far from each other using a variation of the same model. However, the optimal location decisions of firms are very sensitive to changes in the the set up of Hotelling's model. 2 There is a large literature on agglomeration economies that focuses on production driven reasons for co-location of manufacturing, see Rosenthal and Strange (2004) for an overview of empirical evidence from the urban economics literature. We focus on demand driven reasons for co-location because of our focus on retailing, not manufacturing.
in Chade and Smith (2006) , very similar to the specification developed in Anderson et al. (1992) (Chapter 7) and extended to empirical applications by De los Santos et al. (2012) and MoragaGonzález et al. (2015) . 3 In the model, we split the market into separate geographic areas, with each area representing a cluster of multiple car dealers. We assume consumers pay a search cost to visit a dealer cluster, and this cost is a function of the distance between the consumers' home and the cluster. After they pay the cost, consumers are able to inspect all products within a dealer cluster at no additional cost. Consumers simultaneously decide the set of areas they will search, and conditional on that set, they choose the best option. As in Stahl (1982) and Wolinsky (1983) , the model implies that co-location has two effects, a price competition effect and an agglomeration effect of co-location. To validate the use of the search model, we first present empirical evidence that consumer demand is influenced by clusters of co-located dealers by capturing the effects of co-location in a simpler demand framework.
[ Figure 1 about here.]
To estimate the model, we use detailed car transactions data that include all new car transactions from all dealer in a single large market, the price of each transaction, and the distance between the dealer and the consumer's home. Unlike other studies of retail agglomeration, the detailed spatial nature of our data allow us to accurately capture spatial substitution patterns in the new car industry. Estimation results imply that consumer information, and therefore consumer search, is limited. The model predicts that nearly all consumers search less than four geographic areas when purchasing a new car, and the median consumer searches just one geographic area. These results are in line with survey data from industry reports of new car buying habits. We quantify the importance of search frictions by simulating what equilibrium prices would be if consumer's search cost were zero. Our simulation results predict that the average retail price would be $422 lower, which in turn suggests that dealers use consumers' limited information to exercise market power.
We next conduct counterfactual exercises that simulate the closings of incumbent car dealers.
Specifically, we close a single dealer and then re-calculate equilibrium prices and consumer demand.
We then do this for every dealer, one at a time, for both our search model and a standard model that assumes full information. We find that for both models dealer closure results in a decrease in consumer surplus because prices rise and consumers have fewer options. We also find that the total surplus of unclosed dealers increases after dealer closure for both models. However, consumer surplus falls by less in the search model compared to the full information model and the total surplus of unclosed dealers increases by less for the search model compared to the full information model.
The main reason is that the search model implies a smaller price increase because incumbent dealers 3 Moraga- González et al. (2015) , who also study the car industry, assume that consumers pay a search cost for each dealer, as opposed to a geographic location like in our model. There are a number of differences between their paper and ours. Most importantly, they estimate their model using more aggregate data from the Dutch car market, and their focus is to understand the size of search costs are and how search costs can bias estimates in a full information model (similar in spirit to Sovinsky Goeree, 2008), whereas our primary interest is in characterizing the competing effects of retail agglomeration and price competition. They find that a full information demand model can drastically under-estimate market power and over elasticities of demand.
in the same geographic area have an extra incentive to keep prices low, that is to attract consumers to their geographic area. Additionally, if the closed dealer was not in a particular consumer's search/choice set in the first place, closure will have no direct effect on that consumer's surplus.
Both Benmelech et al. (2014) and Ozturk et al. (forthcoming) study the consequences of retail agglomeration effects on retail closures, and both papers find evidence of positive agglomeration effects. Benmelech et al. (2014) uses data across retail industries to estimate the effect of closures due to chain level financial problems on the closure decisions of close-by retail outlets. They find that nearby retail outlets are more likely to close after rival's closure. Ozturk et al. (forthcoming) look at the effect of Chrysler dealer closings on the prices of nearby dealers using a national sample of new car transactions in a differences-in-differences framework. They find that, although prices go up after a closure, the effect of closures on prices moderates with distance. This implies that a co-location agglomeration effect exists, but that it is dominated by a competition effect, a similar result to ours. Our dealer closure counterfactuals are particularly relevant to understanding the effects of massive dealer closures sparked by the financial instability of US car manufacturers over the past decade.
Most of prior work on retail co-location has focused on inferring the effect of agglomeration economies through firm entry and location decisions. Some of these studies have found closing rivals have a net negative effect, for example Seim (2006) , Jia (2008) , and Zhu and Singh (2009) . On the other hand, Vitorino (2012) finds evidence of an agglomeration effect of co-location dominates in a shopping mall setting, and Ellickson et al. (2013) find that agglomeration effect is a function of local market size in the big-box retail industry. We distinctly depart from this literature by estimating a structural model of consumer search for spatially differentiated products. By modeling the explicit mechanism of the agglomeration benefit, we can separately quantify the effects of competition versus agglomeration on firm and consumer behavior. Furthermore, we use the estimated model to evaluate the welfare effects of retail closures.
We also contribute to the growing literature on consumer information, such as Sovinsky Goeree (2008), Hortaçsu and Syverson (2004) , and Hong and Shum (2006) among others. Like in those studies, we find evidence that limited consumer information can bias demand results and counterfactuals in full information models. There are many theoretical studies that recognize that limited consumer information and search leads to agglomeration benefits of co-location, such as Stahl (1982) , Wolinsky (1983) , Wolinsky (1986) , Dudey (1990) , Fischer and Harrington Jr (1996) , among others. However, this idea has not been explored empirically using a consumer search model that captures the demand mechanisms from the theory literature. As such, our paper contributes to more recent literature on the structural estimation of consumer search by explicitly studying the agglomerative benefit of search for firms. In particular, there are numerous recent examples that also nest a simultaneous search framework in a differentiated products demand framework, similar to the example in Anderson et al. (1992) (Chapter 7), for example Wildenbeest (2011) , De los Santos et al. (2012) , Seiler (2013) , Honka (2014) , and Moraga-González et al. (2015) .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data set, consumer search of vehicles and dealership locations, and provides preliminary evidences of agglomeration effects.
Section 3 builds a structural model of consumer search for new vehicles. Section 4 describes the estimation procedure. Section 5 reports the estimation results. Section 6 conducts counterfactual experiments to examine the effects of search friction and the effects of dealership closure. Section 7 concludes.
Data and Overview of the Market
In this section, we first present a detailed description on the data used in the empirical analysis.
Second, we present a set of descriptive statistics documenting the distribution of consumer traveled distance to purchase a new car and the spatial distribution of new car dealers. Lastly, we provide evidence that consumer choices are a function of dealer co-location.
Data
We combine several data sets for our analysis. The first data source provides detailed records of all new vehicle transactions in Richmond, Virginia for four years. The second data source provides general information on characteristics and prices of all vehicles sold during this period, and the third data source provides information on all dealerships. We also use data from the Census for consumer location and demographic characteristics.
The primary data are obtained from the Virginia Department of Motor Vehicles, henceforth DMV, and consist of all new vehicle transactions initially registered in Virginia from 2007 through 2010. For each transaction we know the make, model, and transaction price of the car. We also know the identification number assigned to the dealer by the DMV and the name of the dealer.
Finally, the data include the nine-digit or 5-digit zip code of the purchaser for each transaction.
We make a number of sample selection decisions for the raw data in order to focus on the market for new retail cars. We remove of all commercial vehicles, motorcycles, trailers, and consumer pickup trucks. 4 We also dismiss observations with prices near or at zero, which likely represent something else besides a typical consumer transaction, for example fleet sales, or some error in the data recording process. Furthermore, we dismiss all cars sold in different states and car/dealer pairs with less than 10 transactions per year. After consolidating the data, we observe 792,560 new automobile transactions in the state of Virginia over four years.
We also have general information on car characteristics and pricing from intellichoice.com. This includes characteristics of each trim level of each model of car, invoice prices, manufacturer suggested retail price, and other fees assessed at the time of sale. Intellichoice also furnished us with a list of all customer incentives provided by manufacturers during the time period, which is crucial to constructing a correct transaction price for a car, as dealers in Virginia report the transaction price less manufacturer rebates to the DMV for tax purposes.
4 It is common in the literature to consider pickup trucks a different market. Additionally, some models of pickup trucks have dozens of trim levels that vary widely in price and characteristics, making it problematic to aggregate to the model level.
In order to focus on our research questions, we limit our study to transactions with buyers and sellers both located in the Richmond metropolitan area. We complement the data with U.S. Census demographic data on the income and population at the level of "block groups", which, on average, contain about 1100 people. In total, the Richmond area contains 575 block groups.
Consumer Traveled Distance to Purchase
To calculate the distance of each transaction, we geo-code the consumer locations and the dealer addresses into decimal longitude and latitude coordinates. We observe the zip code of each consumer, and using the zip code centroid provided by the US Census, we assign zip codes to the nearest block group using the Census centroid for each block group. Figure 2 illustrates how far consumers travel to purchase a car. The mean travel distance is about 11.75 miles, the median is 9.74 miles, and the standard deviation is 8.21 miles. However, a more telling statistic that shows how important distance is in the consumer's choice problem is the distance traveled past the nearest dealer. Figure   2 also indicates the distribution of the distances traveled past the nearest dealer. The mean of the extra distance traveled is 6.12 miles, and the median is 5.05 miles. 27% of the buyers bought from the nearest dealer, 52% traveled less than 10 miles, 18% traveled less than 20 miles and only 3% traveled more than 20 miles.
[ Figure 2 about here.]
5 We will refer to the greater Richmond metropolitan area as Richmond. 6 It would be ideal to use trim information, but unfortunately the transaction is not always recorded in such detail.
We assign the base 4-door trim characteristics to each model.
Spatial Distribution of Car Dealers
Dealers in Richmond locate in clusters in a small number of geographic locations, mainly along primary roads and commercial areas. We group the 56 dealers into 9 geographic areas. Figure 6 in the Appendix B shows the distribution of car dealers in Richmond color-coded by the geographic areas we assigned each dealer. The areas range in size from a few dealers to over a dozen. The most common type of area is a suburban commercial center common near most U.S. cities. Richmond has many relatively largely populated suburban areas, whose growth is in part driven by the fact that the city and surrounding area is served by three major interstates, I95, I64, and I295. The city of Richmond is about 62 square miles and has a population of a little over 200,000 residents, but the Richmond metropolitan area is home to more than one million residents, and is the 43rd most populous metropolitan area in the United States. We present a very brief description of each dealer area in Table 2 . The two largest areas are two suburban centers, Short Pump (a suburb 15 miles west of downtown) and Midlothian (a suburb 15 miles southwest of downtown). Each of these areas has a large mall and other commercial activity along a major thoroughfare surrounded by suburban and exurban residential development.
[ 
Preliminary Evidence of Agglomeration Effects
Our paper is about the effects of dealer co-location on consumer and dealer behavior. We hypothesize that these effects happen through a search model where consumers are choosing which geographic areas to visit and learn about cars. Here, we provide evidence that consumer do, in fact, behave in a manner consistent with the search model we propose by establishing that the proximity of dealers to other dealers is a relevant part of consumer choice of a new car. To do this, we estimate a standard discrete choice consumer demand model where we include proxies for agglomeration directly in the utility function. Each consumer i receives indirect utility from each product j located at a particular dealer f at time t, u ijf t . Utility is a function of product and consumer characteristics, and consumers choose a single product that maximizes their utility each time period from the set of all products, including an outside option.
We consider three such proxies for different levels of agglomeration to include in the utility function. First, we define N dealer jf t as the number products offered by the same dealer f as product j in time t. Second, we define N 2miles jf t as the number of available products within two miles. Third, we define N style jf t as the number of products for sale of the same style/class within two miles. We include all three measures at the same time in order to test the hypothesis of whether the effects of agglomeration happen at the dealer level, or at the dealer cluster level. 7 We estimate two specifications of the utility model. The first is a simple logit model based on Berry (1994) , where the only consumer heterogeneity is a idiosyncratic match term, ✏ ijt . The second specification includes observed and unobserved consumer heterogeneity, including consumers' distance to dealers, consumers' income, and a unobserved shock to price disutility, a la BLP, and is very similar to automobile demand model in Murry (2015) and Nurski and Verboven (2015) .
Specifically, the indirect utility function is
where d ijf t is the distance between the consumer and the product (not present in the first specification), and p jf t is the average price of the product j sold by dealer f at time t. x jf t is a set of observed product-dealer characteristics including horsepower, size, MPG, number of passenger seats, whether it is a U.S. brand, a set of body style dummies (i.e., compact sedan, mid-size sedan, large sedan, SUV, wagon, van and others), a set of dealer location dummies that captures local conditions, and a set of yearly dummies. ⇠ jf t is unobserved product-dealer attribute and ✏ ijt is an idiosyncratic shock. Lastly, we normalize the indirect utility of not purchasing a car to u 0t = ✏ 0t .
The motivation for estimating the choice model presented in equation (1) is to test if consumers make purchase decisions that are influenced by dealer co-location. Positive evidence of this would imply that there are agglomeration effects of co-location for the dealers. It is also consistent with behavior implied by the consumer search model we present in the next section. The primary parameters of interest are ( 1 , 2 , 3 ), which measure the different agglomeration effects. For example, if 1 were positive, then we would infer that consumers prefer purchasing cars from dealers with more product offerings, conditional on distance, price, and the other car and dealer characteristics that we include in the utility function.
First, we follow Berry (1994) by restricting consumer heterogeneity and setting = 0, and
where we assume that the product-dealer-time specific shock, ⇠ jf t , is uncorrelated with a set of instruments, Z, to derive the moment conditions, E[⇠|Z] = 0, and proceed with estimation using two stage least squares. We specifically exclude price from the instrument set because price is likely correlated with ⇠ through the firm's pricing first order condition.
The second specification follows closely Berry et al. (2004) and Murry (2015) . We allow the distance between the consumer and the dealer to affect utility and we allow heterogeneity in the price parameter with the following form: , by matching the product shares in the data with those predicted by the model using the contraction mapping suggested in BLP. Then we recover the product-dealer-time specific shock as the residual to a linear regression,⇠ jf t , and generate moment conditions by making the assumption that it is orthogonal to a set of instruments, E[⇠|Z] = 0. We then minimize the weighted squared sum of the moment conditions, along with micro-moment conditions that match the observed average purchase distance to the predicted average purchase distance. 8
[ We present the results from the two specifications in Table 3 . The parameter estimates from both specifications are broadly consistent with each other. First, the price parameters are sensible and compare to the literature on demand for automobiles. The results imply an average price-cost markup of around $4,000 (not shown). They key parameters are ( 1 , 2 , 3 ). Our key finding is that 3 is positive and larger than 1 and 2 . In the case of the first specification, 3 is statistically significant and statistically larger than both 1 and 2 . In words, consumers are more likely to purchase a car if there are more same-style cars being sold within two miles, conditional on the total number of cars being offered for sale at the dealer (which has a negative parameter in both specifications) and the number of total cars being offered within two miles. The results imply that dealer co-location influences consumer choice and that there is evidence that this happens at the level of dealer clusters as opposed to the level of the dealership. We take this as validation for the consumer search model we present in the next section, where we assume consumers pay a fixed search cost for each geographical area. Notice that the parameter is not capturing population density, because we are explicitly modeling distance and an unobserved location effect. Also, are estimated conditional on prices, which we treat as endogenous, so the results are conditional on a potential endogenous price response to location.
Identification of the agglomeration effect. Identification of the agglomeration parameters above comes from covariation in sales with the different measures of the number of alternative vehicles offered for sale nearby. This is primitively a feature of the market structure. There may be a concern that market structure is not exogenous, or in other words N style jf t is positively correlated with ⇠ jf t . This would bias the agglomeration parameters upwards in the utility function. However, we are not concerned with this potential issue for two reasons. First, the car dealer industry is associated with many state regulations governing the entry and placement of dealers. Because of the this, most dealers have been operating for many decades, and there is very little entry during the time period, so it seems reasonable that location decisions are not correlated with contemporaneous demand shocks. Second, we include geographic location fixed effects to control for unobserved location factors. Therefore, the variation in the number of available products is within a dealer's geographical area over time.
Most of the changes in market structure over this time period are due to the national closings of brands, such as Pontiac, Saturn, Saab, Mercury, and Hummer. This is what is primarily causing variation in the N variables in the utility function. These closures are likely uncorrelated with unobserved factors associated with local geographic areas in Richmond, Virginia, and taking changes in market structure for these reasons as exogenous is a reasonable assumption. 9
Demand Model
We consider a market where differentiated cars sold by many different geographically dispersed dealers are sold to geographically dispersed consumers. As in the previous section, we use subscript i to denote consumer, subscript j to denote car model (for example Ford Fusion), subscript f to denote dealer (ie "Bob's Honda Sales"), and subscript t to denote year. Consumer i makes a discrete choice, either to purchase a new car model from a dealer or to consume an outside option. The indirect utility that consumer i derives from purchasing the car model j from dealer f in year t is
where x jf t is a vector of observed product-dealer attributes, p jf t is the average price of model j sold by dealer f in year t, 10 ↵ i is a consumer-specific price coefficient, ⇠ jf t is unobserved productdealer-year attribute, and " ijf t captures an idiosyncratic match value. We assume that consumers must search to find out the exact utility they derive from each car sold by each dealer. To be more specific, we assume that before searching consumers know the product attributes (x jf t , p jf t and ⇠ jf t ). It is reasonable to assume that consumers have knowledge of car characteristics and some sense of dealer specific prices. This type of information is available on a plethora of car buying websites. Also, advertisements may communicate this information, along with information about dealer specific prices, for example the willingness of each dealer to give price discounts. However, we assume consumers do not know their idiosyncratic match values ✏ ijf t , which capture those product and dealer attributes that can only be ascertained upon visiting the dealer, such as the fit and personal comfortability of the car, or a personal image in the car, or the specific way dealer salespeople sell particular cars. Costly search reveals ✏ ijf t to the consumer. 11 Specifically, we assume the following functional form for the disutility from price:
where h i is the log of household i's yearly income, and & i follows a standard normal distribution.
when a national merger is assumed to be exogenous of local market unobservables. It is also the identification strategy used by Benmelech et al. (2014) in a similar setting of retail chain closures. 10 We only know the price paid by the consumer for the chosen alternative, not the price that the same consumer would have been charged for alternatives not purchased. Hence, from our transaction data, we compute the average price at the model-dealer-year level and use that as the price faced by consumers. Modeling consumer specific prices for each choice would likely involve some type of a bargaining model, which is outside the scope of this paper. 11 We assume that the only search dimension is the match value. In terms of outcome of the demand model, this is equivalent to assuming that the only search dimension is the price. The only difference is the interpretation of the idiosyncratic taste. For example, the model of utility with price uncertainty can be specified as u ijf t = x jf t ↵ip ijf t + ⇠ jf t , wherep ijf t is the individual-specific price that consumer i does not know before search. We can decomposep ijf t into the average price (p jf t ) and an idiosyncratic term ( ijf t ) asp ijf t = p jf t + ijf t . Then, " ijf t in our current setup is just ↵i ijf t . These two models have the identical demand side empirical content, modulo assumptions on the distribution of the uncertainty. However, the supply sides of the model are quite different. Price uncertainty on the part of consumers generates a complicated pricing game between dealers, which is beyond the scope of our current work.
Then, we can write the utility specified in equation (2) as
where jf t is the mean utility that is common to all consumers:
and µ ijf t is the consumer heterogeneous disutility from the average price:
Consumers have an outside option, including purchasing from a dealer outside Richmond, or nonpurchase, or purchase of a used car. We model the utility from the outside choice as u i0t = " i0t .
Search Mechanism
Existing theoretical literature typically model consumer search strategies in two ways. One strand of the literature assumes non-sequential, or simultaneous, search strategy, where consumers sample a fixed number of sellers and choose to purchase from the most preferred seller among those they have test to what extent consumers are indeed using sequential and non-sequential search strategies.
They found that in their setting, the non-sequential search strategy outperforms the sequential search model. Honka and Chintagunta (2014) use variation in actual prices in consumers' observed considerations sets to conclude that simultaneous search better matches their data on the demand for auto insurance. Because we do not observe consumers' consideration sets in our data, we are unable to let the data tell us which search strategy better represents our empirical setting. In this paper, therefore, we assume that consumers engage in costly simultaneous search in order to learn the exact match values. This would be consistent with a consumer learning about the locations and general offerings of all dealers in the market in some pre-search stage, and then planning a shopping trip that includes all of the geographic areas that make it into the consumers search set.
In the model, consumers have the choice to search cars at one or more of nine possible dealer areas. Each dealer area represents a geographic area where dealers are clustered. Consumers pay a fixed cost to search each area, and once the cost is incurred they learn " ijf t for every car in the area. The choice set of a particular consumer is made up of only those cars from those areas that she has searched. We normalize the search cost of the outside good to zero, so that every consumer 12 See Stigler (1961) , Burdett and Judd (1983) , and Janssen and Moraga-González (2004) .
choice set includes the outside option. Consumers simultaneously decide the set of areas they will search, and conditional on that set, they choose the best option. The model is a parametric version of the optimal portfolio choice problem discussed in Chade and Smith (2006) , very similar to the specifications of De los Santos et al. (2012) and Moraga-González et al. (2015) . 13 Let F mt be the set of dealers located in area m, and J ft be the set of products sold by dealer f . To obtain a closed-form expression, we follow the literature in assuming that " ijf t and " i0t follow a standard type-I extreme value distribution i.i.d. across consumers, car models, dealers and time.
Hence, consumer i's expected gain from visiting a subset of areas S is
Let c im denote the search cost of visiting area m. We assume that the search cost is linear in the distance from her home address to the dealer location. That is, c im = d im , where d im is the distance from consumer i's location to a particular area m. We define the value of visiting a subset S as
where ! iSt is an individual and choice set specific term that captures the unobserved search cost shocks, such as the traffic patterns. If consumer i does not search any area, then S = Ø. In this case, U it (Ø) = 0, P m2Ø c im = 0, and V it (Ø) = ! iØt . To solve for the optimal search set of the consumer we obtain a closed-form expression for
, by assuming that ! iSt follows a standard type I extreme value distribution. Then, we can get the probability that consumer i visits a subset S ⇤ :
where S is the set of all possible search sets.
13 However, we do not adopt the Marginal Improvement Algorithm (MIA) proposed by Chade and Smith (2006) to find the optimal choice set of each consumer, because the conditions of MIA are not satisfied in our context. Instead, we follow De los Santos et al. (2012) and Moraga-González et al. (2015) .
Purchase Decision
The probability that consumer i purchases product j from dealer f conditional on a search set S is
where m f is the area that dealer f is located in. Then, the unconditional probability that consumer i purchases product j from dealer f is
Let consumer areas be indexed l = 1..L, and let F l (·) be the area-specific distribution of consumer income h i . Additionally let n lt be the number of potential consumers in area l. The predicted demand for each vehicle model from each dealer is obtained by aggregating individual choice probabilities over all areas:
where
represents all "non-linear" parameters of the model.
Dealer Agglomeration and Consumer Demand
The effects of dealer co-location are straightforward in the model. Dealer areas with more dealers will, all else equal, have a greater value of U it (S). The more products in a search set, the greater the chance that a high utility product is found. This comes through increased variation in the observed characteristics of cars as choice sets increase, along with the fact that more draws of idiosyncratic shock, ✏ ijf t , increase the maximum order statistic. 14 In turn, the higher the value of U it (S) the more likely the consumer will choose to search that dealer area. Variation in chosen search sets across consumers is generated by different draws of search set specific idiosyncratic cost shocks, ! iSt , and differences in distances to different dealer areas. Holding travel distances constant, dealer areas with more products offered will be searched with greater probability. The size of search costs will ultimately determine how many dealer areas are searched by each consumer. However, as is pointed out by Chade and Smith (2006) , the optimal set of dealer areas for each consumer will not necessarily follow a cut off rule of an ordering of U it (S)'s from highest to lowest.
Estimation Methodology
Our estimation follows recent literature that has combined the methods of BLP with micro level data, for example Berry et al. (2004) , Petrin (2002), and Sovinsky Goeree (2008) , in a General
Method of Simulated Moments framework. The method employs the nested fixed point structure of BLP that has an outer and inner loop, but uses both the aggregate moments suggested by BLP as well as moments derived from the individual nature of the data. In the outer loop, we search for all non-linear parameters, ✓ = (↵ 0 , ↵ 1 , ↵ 2 , ), that minimize a GMM objective function. For any guess of ✓ we solve for t (✓) from the contraction mapping suggested in BLP in the inner loop. During the inner loop we recover those fixed effects in the mean utility equation (5) using linear regression.
For any candidate value of ✓, we calculate the aggregate market share of each product from each dealer:
where M t is the total number of potential consumers M t = P l n lt . Calculating s jf involves computing the choice probabilities which involves a multi-dimensional integral which cannot be computed analytically. We use simulation methods to approximate the integral, using the empirical distribution of individual characteristics by Census block-group for the case of consumer demographics. We simulate ten consumers from each of the 574 Census blockgroups. We then weight each individual based on their block-group population. Let s jf t be the observed market share of product j sold by dealer f in year t. The solution to s jf ( t , p t ; ✓) = s jf t exists and is unique (see the Appendix A for the proof). The solution is denoted by t (✓). We are able to use the contraction mapping suggested by BLP to solve for t (✓). After inverting demand using the contraction mapping, we solve for the model-dealer-year specific demand unobservables as
To control for the correlation of price p jf t with the unobserved product attribute ⇠ jf t , we use the competing product characteristics as the instrumental variables. Hence, the first set of empirical moment conditions are given by
where N 1 is the number of model-dealer-year-level observations and Z
jf t is a set of instrument variables. Notice that because of the car style, location, and year fixed effects, the moment conditions are expressed over the transitory component of the unobserved quality.
The second set of moment conditions matches the predicted consumer purchase distance with the observed distance. Because we include individual heterogeneity, we also use simulation at this step. We integrate out the random shock and income heterogeneity in ↵ i by taking ten draws over the corresponding distributions for each individual. In particular, let y ijf t equal to one if consumer i bought the vehicle j from dealer f in year t and equal to zero otherwise. We compute the following moment conditions:
where Z
ijf t includes the distance traveled by consumer i to buy the vehicle j from dealer f in year t, and P ijf t (✓) is the simulated choice probability for each consumer. The number N 2 is the number of consumer-model-dealer-year-level observations in the sample. 15 We stack the micro and macro moment conditions and then minimize their weighted distance from zero by choosing ✓. The estimates of ✓ are given bŷ
(✓)] 0 and W is the block diagonal weighting matrix.
Identification
As shown by the literature, parameters of the utility function can be identified from the variation of market shares in product characteristics. In this section we provide an informal discussion on the identification of the key parameters of the model, the price coefficients ↵ and the transportation cost parameter . To identify the price coefficient, we need to find relevant and valid instruments to solve the simultaneity problem between price and unobserved characteristics, ⇠ jf t . Here, the simultaneity problem arises because dealers and consumers observe the unobserved attribute ⇠ jf t when making their decisions and so prices will adjust in the short-run to changes in ⇠ jf t . Following the literature, we use the own product characteristics and the average exogenous characteristics of competing products as instruments for price. Here, we have rich variation in these instruments because we define competing firms as those dealers within 10 miles. In addition, we use the number of car models with the same body style and the the number of all car models within 10 miles.
The specific search mechanism that we model is not identified per se. Because we do not observe choice sets or search behavior, we cannot reject another search model, or non-search model, in favor of our model. Our analysis in section 2.4 is designed to validate our choice of search model. In turn, the search cost parameters are identified conditional on our parametric assumptions about search.
The parameter on distance, , is identified from variation in distance and choice probabilities in the data. The identification of the search cost parameters relies on the assumption that dealer entry, exit and location are not correlated with the unobserved demand shocks, ⇠ jf t . Since the utility function includes dealers' location fixed effect and time fixed effect, ⇠ jf t only captures those transitory local demand shocks. Hence, this assumption is valid if dealers' entry, exit or location decisions are based on the long-run local conditions that are allowed to be contained in the location 15 In practice we construct the micro-moments using a randomly selected 10% sample of the individual transactions each time period. fixed effects and aggregate economic shocks that are captured by the time fixed effects, but not on the realization of the transitory shock ⇠ jf t . This assumption is reasonable in our context for the following reasons. First, the sunk cost involving the entry, exit and location change of a dealer is large. This is partly due to regulations that limit entry and exit. Hence, there is very little entry of dealers in the industry, and when there is entry it is often a new brand entering at an existing dealer location. Also, to the extent the local demographics and population change over time, initial decisions about entry may not reflect current demographics, population, or other transitory factors.
Third, forced exit of dealers by the manufacturer is very difficult in this industry because of state laws requiring payments to dealers for termination of franchise contracts. Lastly, there are other state laws that make it difficult for entry and exit, including mandated exclusive territories for brands.
For a discussion of the regulatory environment see Lafontaine and Morton (2010) and Murry and Schnieder (2015) . If our argument is invalid and dealers endogenously make their location choices based on the realization of the transitory shocks ⇠ jf t , our estimates of search cost parameter would be upward biased.
Discussion of Results
In this section we discuss the parameter estimates. We also simulate the model to learn about the extent of consumer information the model implies. Lastly, we present a model of pricing, and use the model to infer marginal costs, which will be important for counterfactual simulations.
Preference Parameter Estimates
The parameter estimates for the search model are presented in Table 4 . The estimated coefficients of horsepower/size, MPG and seats are all positive and significant, indicating that all else equal, consumers prefer more powerful and more fuel efficient cars with more passenger seats.
Recall that price coefficients enter the consumers' utility function in a non-linear way, see equation (3). Hence, a positive estimate of ↵ 1 implies that price has a negative impact on consumers' mean utility, and a negative estimate of ↵ 2 implies that consumers with higher income are less price sensitive. The implied consumer-model-dealer-year level own-price elasticities of demand are between -9.46 and -2.12, with a sales weighted average of -4.10. This suggests that consumers are price sensitive on average, but there is substantial heterogeneity. Overall, our estimates of price elasticities are generally consistent with previous studies of automobile demand. For example, the average own-price elasticity is equal to -4.1 in Albuquerque and Brooenberg (2012), -5.3 in Murry (2015) , and -3.14 in Nurski and Verboven (2015) .
The distance search cost parameter is large in magnitude and precisely estimated. It implies that consumers are very sensitive to distance. Next, we explore how the search the implications of the estimated search costs in detail.
Search Cost and Search Frequency
To get a sense of the economic magnitude of the parameters, it is useful to consider how large the price difference between two stores needs to be to justify a ten-mile distance greater traveled for the consumer. The value of this coefficient is obtained by taking the ratio of over the price coefficient ↵ i . The average value of this ratio is equal to $79 per ten miles and the median is $77 per ten miles. The distribution of dollars per ten miles is shown in Figure 3. [ Figure 3 about here.]
The estimated travel cost is substantially lower than those reported in Moraga-González et al. (2015) do not observe which dealer she bought from, so they rely on the model to tell them what dealer she bought from. However, we incorporate exact purchase distance information, which may imply that consumers purchase from further away dealer than there model predicts. Our search cost is also much lower than studies of consumer demand for cars that include distance in the indirect utility function, like Nurski and Verboven (2015) and Murry (2015) . For example Nurski and Verboven (2015) obtain an average travel cost of €112 per kilometer.These differences suggest that the fact that our model has a friction for search costs can help rationalize the purchase patterns with lower costs of distance.
Next, we consider what the estimates imply about how much consumers search by using the results of the search model to simulate purchase behavior. In Figure 4 , we plot the histogram of the number of searches per consumer from this simulation. In general, search is limited. We predict that conditional on positive search, 49% search only one area and less than 1% search four areas.
This results are generally consist with industrial reports and previous studies. For example, in a survey by DME Automotive, an industry consulting group, 47% of all new car buyers report only visiting a single dealer before purchasing a car. Moraga-González et al. (2015) also report that 47% of their survey respondents searched visit only one dealer. Although our model does not have empirical content regarding specifically how many dealerships are searched, we can at least say that searching two or more areas implies searching at least two dealers. 16 16 See http://www.dmeautomotive.com/announcements/1-in-6-car-buyers-skips-test-drive-nearly-half-visit-justone-or-no-dealership-prior-to-purchase. In principle, we could use this information to add a moment inequality to our estimation objective function. However, we prefer to use survey data such as this to think about model validation.
[ Figure 4 about here.]
Supply-Side Model and Recovering Price-Cost Markups
Although we do not use a model of car retail supply to estimate the demand parameters, we do use a supply model in counterfactuals, so it is important to report the implications of the supply model given the estimated demand parameters. Below we describe our supply-side model.
The profit of dealer f is defined as
where mc jf t is the constant marginal cost of product j sold by dealer f in year t, and F C ft represents fixed cost.
Dealers simultaneously maximize profit by setting price, taking into account prices and attributes of competing dealers. 17 The first order condition for a particular dealer that defines a Nash Equilibrium in prices is
Let 4 denote the price derivative matrix with the row j column k element
We define an ownership matrix ⌦ ⇤ , with ⌦(j, k) ⇤ = 1 if product j and k are sold by the same dealer and zero otherwise. Let ⌦ = ⌦ ⇤ ⇥ 4(p) . Then, equation (12) can be written in matrix notation as the following markup equation
Given the estimated demand parameters, we compute the price cost markups from equation (13).
The weighted average price-cost markup, defined as the difference between price and marginal cost, is $6,015 and the median is $6,051. We display the distribution of dealer margins, p mc p , in Figure  5 
Counterfactual Simulations
We present results from two counterfactuals scenarios. The first counterfactual is aimed at understanding how firms derive market power from limited consumer information and costly consumer search. The second counterfactual is aimed at understanding the effects of dealer co-location on market outcomes and consumer welfare. Specifically, our goal is to decompose the effect into the agglomeration effect and price competition effect. We do this by simulating dealer closures, and then decomposing the mechanisms that generate a new pricing equilibrium.
Search Frictions
The estimated model provides a way for us to understand the sources of dealer margins. The standard source of market power in discrete choice models of demand is attributed to product differentiation. Additionally, our model implies that market power is also attributed to search frictions. Search frictions create incomplete choice sets for consumers as is seen in Figure 4 , where the implied search intensity of consumers is quite low -the median searching consumer only searches one geographic area. Search frictions can have two opposite effects on price. On one hand, incomplete choice sets can lead to market power for firms because consumers are more captive to firms given they have fewer choice options. Firms have the ability to raise prices because, conditional on a choice set, consumers do not have as many options available as they would if search costs were zero. This is the "competition effect." Due to this effect, higher search cost would lead to higher price. On the other hand, because consumers decide their search set of geographic areas by making a tradeoff between the expected utility of a search set and the search costs associated with that set, higher search cost would encourage dealers to lower prices to attract more consumers to visit their area. This is the "agglomeration effect." Due to this effect, higher search cost would lead to lower price. Whether the competition effect dominates the agglomeration effect is an empirical question, depending on the model primitives. 18 To quantify the impact of search cost on market power, we consider a scenario in which each consumer has full information and considers all products, the standard assumption in the literature.
To simulate this scenario, we set P iS = 1 for all i and all S, so that every consumer is permitted to "search" every dealer area for free. In Table 5 In her setting, firms advertise the existence of products to consumers, which creates limited choice sets. She finds that her model implies markups about three times higher than a full information model. She does not have the second effect that if prices rise too high then consumers will not include a product in their choice set.
19 In estimation we match predicted shares to the data exactly, so prices in the data are identical to model predictions for the search model. Table 14 in Appendix B compares the weighted average markups for each brand in the case of our estimated search cost to those in the case of zero search cost. This allows us to examine the additional markup firms earn as a result of search frictions. The weighted average markup predicted by the search model is $6,015 and the weighted average markup predicted by the full information model is $5,593. Our results imply that about 8% of markups are attributed to search frictions in this market. Results suggest that the "competition effect" dominates the "agglomeration effect" so that the prices and hence markup predicted by the search model are in general higher than those predicted by the full information model. Currently the idiosyncratic shocks in our model generate product differentiation and thus market power. Although we are unable to estimate the variance of these shocks, if they had less variance than what we assume, ⇡ 2 6 , then markups would be even more attributable to search frictions, so we consider our finding conservative.
Dealer Closures
Using our structural model we simulate dealer closures in order to tease out the competition and agglomeration effect of dealer co-location, and to understand what biases a full information model might have when considering such a counterfactual. A dealership closure generates two effects to the remaining dealers located in the same area. First, closing a dealer reduces the total attraction of the whole area, and thus forces the dealers in this area to reduce their prices. This is the "agglomeration effect". Second, closing a dealer directly reduces the price competition among dealers in the same area, and hence pushes the price higher. This is the "competition effect". 21
The agglomerative effects of retail closures is particularly salient given the recent U.S. financial crisis of 2007-2009 that saw many retail firm exits due to bankruptcy and other financial issues. Benmelech et al. (2014) document massive retail exits due to financial reasons, such as bankruptcy, during the financial crisis. 22 They find evidence of agglomeration effects of closures of bankrupt firms' stores on non-bankrupt incumbent stores using data on the location and closures of multiple retail chains across the US. New car dealers also saw a large swath of retail closures during and immediately following the financial crisis. For example, Chrysler, General Motors, and Ford all closed dealers for financial reasons in 2009 and 2010. However, as described in Lafontaine and model and a full information model very similar to ours. The key difference in the two models is that in their model, consumers search at the dealer level as opposed to a geographic area. They also predict changes to manufacturer surplus after dealer re-organization and find that manufacturers would prefer to consolidate brands under one dealership.
21 In complementary work, Ozturk et al. (forthcoming) examine the agglomeration versus competition effects of dealer closures. They use a national sample of car sales to infer a treatment effect of Chrysler dealership closures on rivals' prices. They find that an average, rivals' prices increase after a Chrysler closure, but prices of nearby dealers increase much less than distant dealer. They interpret their results as providing evidence that the competition effect dominates the agglomeration effect overall but the agglomeration effect is present because nearby dealers experience a lower price increase than far away dealer after the closures. To separately examine the agglomeration effect and the competition effect we calculate the equilibrium outcomes in the following two scenarios. In the first scenario, after the dealer closure we allow the consumers to adjust their probability of searching (P iS ), but we hold constant the probability of purchase conditional on each search set (P ijf t|S ). This quantifies the agglomeration effect: firms will adjust their equilibrium prices only for the reason to attract new searchers to their dealer area, not to price compete against a rival in the same geographic area. In the second scenario, we hold constant the probability of searching (P iS ) but adjust the probability of purchasing condition on each search set (P ijf t|S ). This quantifies the competition effect: firms will adjust their 23 Saab, the major Swedish produced car brand, was owned by General Motors until 2011. After 2011, the company re-organized, and started producing cars again in 2014. 24 http://tinyurl.com/cotzn9 25 For example of popular press coverage of dealer closures, see http://tinyurl.com/p7zvgys. 26 For an alternative explanation having to do with promotional activities by the manufacturer, see Murry (2015) .
price only to compete with local rivals, not to attract more consumers to search their geographic area. In both scenarios, we measure the separate effects on the dealers by comparing the difference in prices, sales and markups. Lastly, we allow the consumer to adjust both her search decisions and choice probabilities conditional on search to quantify the total effect.
To measure the welfare effects of dealer closure, we follow the literature (see Petrin (2002) and Fan (2013) ) and define consumer welfare change as the compensating variation. The compensating variation for consumer i is given by
where ↵ i < 0 is the negative of the consumer i's marginal value of income, and V 0
i h i are the expected maximum utility for consumer i with income h i before and after a dealer closure. Specifically,
i . The post-closure utility V 1 ilt is analogously defined by replacing U 0 iSt with U 1 iSt and u 0 ijlt with u 1 ijlt . Given the compensating variation for a specific consumer, the change in the average consumer surplus in zip code l in year t is given by
The total consumer welfare change is the sum of the welfare changes in all zip codes, 4CS = P lt n lt CS lt , where n lt is the number of households in zip code l in year t. The change in average per-consumer consumer surplus is
Dealer closure case: small dealer First, we simulate new equilibria as described above for the closing of a small dealer, henceforth Table 6 presents the agglomeration effect, competition effect and the total effect of closing this particular dealer.
In the first two rows, we present the results when we only allow adjustment of the probability of searching (i.e., P iS ). This is the agglomeration effect of closing a dealer. We can see that other dealers in the same area would reduce their price by $3 and their total sales in 2007 would suffer a loss of around 7 units. Dealers located in other areas would increase their price by $1 and their total sales would increase by 4 units.
In the third and fourth rows, we present results when we only allow adjustment of the probability of buying each product given a search set (i.e., P ijf t|S ). This is the competition effect of closing a dealer. We can see that other dealers' price would increase by $4 on average and total sales in 2007 would increase by around 7 units. Dealers located in other areas would increase their price by $1 and total sales would increase by 10 units.
In the last two rows, we present results when we allow adjustment of both P iS and P ijf t|S . This is the total effect of closing a dealer. We can see that other dealers' average price in the same area stay almost the same and total sales in 2007 increase by only very slightly. This is because the agglomeration effect and competition effect offset with each other. Dealers located in other areas would increase their price by $2 on average and total sales would increase by around 13 units.
The welfare effects of closing Small is reported in Table 7 . We compare the effects implied by the search model to a model with full information. The first row shows that the welfare change for the search model. Overall, the consumer surplus declines by 0.027% of the pre-closure consumer surplus and the total surplus of all dealers decreases by 0.294% of the pre-closure dealer surplus.
Among these dealer surplus change, the total surplus of unclosed dealers in the same area increases by 0.104% whereas the total surplus of all unclosed dealers in other areas increases by 0.067%. The second row of Table 7 shows that the consumer surplus change for full information model is -0.281%, and the total surplus of unclosed dealers in the same area increases by 0.211% whereas the total surplus of all unclosed dealers in other areas increases by 0.213%. The full information model over-predicts the consumer welfare loss. The main reason is that in the full information model, a dealer closure lessens the total choices available to all consumers. But in the search model, only a fraction of consumers had the closed dealer in their choice set in the first place, so the closure does not impact the surplus of as many consumers. Additionally, the price changes are less severe in the search model because higher prices have the added negative effect of decreasing search probabilities. The full information model also over-predicts the surplus gain for unclosed dealers after a dealer closure. The reason is that agglomeration effect a lower rise in prices to offset the decreased attraction of the area due to the closure of a dealer in the area. Ignoring this effect would overestimate the consumer welfare loss and overestimate the benefits that other dealers can get from a closure of a competing dealer.
[ Dealer closure case: large dealer Next we examine the impacts of closing a large dealer, henceforth Large. Large sold 1903 units of cars in 2007, the largest in our sample in this year. Similar to the analysis above, we first only allow the adjustment of P iS , then only allow the adjustment of P ijf t|S , and lastly allow the adjustment of both P iS and P ijf t|S . We present the analogous results to the last section in Table 8 : the agglomeration effect, competition effect and the total effect of closing Large. The agglomeration effect is displayed in the first two rows. Unclosed dealers in the same area would reduce their price by $23 and their total sales for 2007 sales would suffer a loss of around 246 units, whereas dealers located in other areas would increase their price by $5 and their total sales would increase by 77 units. The competition effect is displayed in the middle two rows. We find that unclosed dealers in the same area would increase price by $45 on average and sell 374 more total units, whereas the impact on dealers in other areas is small. We display the total effect in the last two rows. Same area prices would increase by $19 on average and total sales would increase by around 125 units, whereas dealers located in other areas would increase their price by $12 and their total sales would increase by around 207 units.
We calculate the consumer welfare change and dealer surplus change both for the full search model and full information model. The results are reported in Table 9 . The search model predicts that the consumer surplus declines by 0.576% of the pre-closure consumer surplus and the total surplus of all dealers decreases 6.072% of the pre-closure dealer surplus. Among these dealer surplus changes, the total surplus of unclosed dealers in the same area increases by 2.451% whereas the total surplus of all unclosed dealers in other areas increases by 1.465%. The full information model predicts that the consumer welfare declines by 4.378%, total surplus of unclosed dealers in the same area increases by 3.496% whereas the total surplus of all unclosed dealers in other areas increases by 3.336%. Again, the full information model over-predicts the consumer welfare loss and over-predicts the surplus gain of unclosed dealers.
Average Effect of Dealer Closures
The previous section shows how the framework in this paper can be used to study the effects of a single dealer closure in one specific market. It gives insight into the particular mechanisms at play in our model. However, these were just two case studies, and these dealers may not be representative of all dealers in the market we consider. Next, we investigate the general pattern of how the welfare effect of dealer closure varies with dealer characteristics. To do this, we compute the welfare effects when we close each dealer, one at a time. ft denote the percentage change in total surplus of all dealers, Q ft denote the sales of the closed dealer, and AreaShare ft denote the market share of the closed dealer in its geographic area.
[ Table 10 about here.]
The search model predicts that consumer surplus declines by 0.115% on average, across dealer closures, and the total surplus of all unclosed dealers in the same area increases by around 0.486% on average. The full information model predicts that the mean consumer welfare loss is 1.393% and the total surplus gain of all unclosed dealers in the same area is 0.887% on average. Therefore, ignoring the search frictions and agglomeration effect would overestimate the consumer welfare loss and overestimate the benefits that other dealers can get from a closure of a competing dealer.
Looking at the percentiles of the welfare change distributions, the search model predicts very skewed distributions. This corresponds to the skewed distribution of the size of the closed dealer and the skewed distribution of the market share of the closed dealer in its area.
As seen in Table 10 , dealer surplus for incumbent dealers increases after a single dealer closure (rows two and three in each panel). However, notable is that the full information model overstates the gain in dealer surplus after a closure for those dealers in the same geographic area as the closed dealer. This is because incumbent dealers do not raise prices by too much after a rival closure in order to keep their area attractive to search, whereas in the no-search model this mechanism does not exist. Change in total producer surplus, DS, is strictly negative under the full information model, but this is not the case for the search model. This is due to the different effects depending on the size of the closed dealer and the total sales and search intensity of the geographic area of the closed dealer.
To understand the relationship between the welfare effects and the characteristics of the closed dealer, we run regressions of welfare effects on the characteristics of the closed dealer, in particular, the size of the closed dealer and the market share of the closed dealer in its area. Notice that this regression captures a correlation pattern rather than a causal effect. However, it is a useful way to summarize the results from the counterfactual simulations and to broadly confirm our intuition about the different mechanisms in the model. The results of the regressions are reported in Table   11 .
[ Table 11 about here.]
The welfare effect of dealer closure depends on the size of the closed dealer. If a large dealer is closed, after controlling for its share in its area, this would increase the market power of its neighboring competitors. As a result, other unclosed dealers in the same area would increase their prices. Higher prices in that area would also lead to higher prices of other areas due to the competition among areas. This explains why both the total surplus of unclosed dealers in the same area (4DS same ft ) and the total surplus of unclosed dealers in other areas (4DS other ft ) increase in the size of the closed dealer. Due to the higher prices, consumers are worse off; in other words, consumer welfare change (4CS ft ) decreases in the size of the closed dealer. Another factor is the market share of the closed dealer in its area. This measures how important the dealer is to its area. If a dealer with a large share in its area is closed, after controlling for its size, this would significantly decrease the attraction of that area. As a result, other unclosed dealers in the same area would lose a substantial amount of consumer visits and thus sales. To offset the declined attraction of the whole area, they have to reduce their prices. Lower price in that area would also lead to lower prices of other areas due to the competition among areas. This explain why both the total surplus of unclosed dealers in the same area and the total surplus of unclosed dealers in other areas decrease in the area share of the closed dealer. Due to the lower prices, consumers are better off ; in other words, 4CS
ft increases in the area share of the closed dealer. Next, we examine the sources that drive the fact that the full information models overestimates the consumer welfare loss and the surplus gain of unclosed dealers due to a dealer closing. We define the bias as the difference between the percentage change predicted by the full information model and the percentage change predicted by the search model. We regress these bias terms on dealer and market characteristics. The two characteristics we use are the total sales of the dealer, and the share of dealer sales in its area before closure. We use both of these variables because we are interested in teasing out the contribution of dealer size conditional on the size of the dealer cluster, and also the relative importance in a cluster conditional on gross dealer size. The results of the regressions are reported in Table 12 . Both factors are important contributors to the bias between the full information model and the search model because these two factors are both positively related to how large the agglomeration effect is implied by the model in a particular dealer cluster. The "larger" a dealer, both in raw terms and relative terms to nearby dealers, the more the full information model will overstate the effects of dealer closures because it does not capture the countervailing agglomeration effect.
[ Table 12 about here.]
Conclusion
In this paper, we estimate a structural model of consumer search for spatially differentiated products, applied to the new car market. Our approach contributes to the literature on consumer demand with limited information and the literature on retail agglomeration by formally modeling consumer search for spatially differentiated products where the co-location of retail stores effects the consumers' search and purchase decisions. We also validate our modeling assumptions by showing, in a simpler framework, that consumer purchasing decisions are partly a function of dealer agglomeration. Given the amount of agglomeration in different retail industries, this is an important finding on its own because it provides evidence of demand based reasons for retail agglomeration, as opposed to cost side reasons.
Compared to the standard full-information model, our model implies greater market power for car dealers. After a dealer closure, our model predicts smaller consumer welfare loss and smaller dealer surplus gain (for incumbent dealers) after a single dealer closure than the a full information model. Our results suggest that both the competition and agglomeration effects matter after a dealer closure. For example, in the case of the small dealer closure, these effects almost equally balanced each other out. In the case of the large dealer closure, we found that the competition effect dominates, and that incumbent dealers are better off. Our results are consistent with Ozturk et al. (forthcoming) , but are at odds with the findings of Benmelech et al. (2014) , who find a negative overall effect on nearby rivals after closure. However, in the case of Benmelech et al. (2014) , the competition effect would be expected to be small because they examine the effect across unrelated products.
To be sure, our analysis relies on particular assumptions, and although we are confident that our model captures the major features of this industry, some caveats are worth mentioning. First, although we feel like the evidence we present strongly suggests dealer agglomeration is a consumer consideration during the car buying process, the search process may be more complicated than our model presents. In particular, the recent proliferation of car-buying websites aimed at alleviating consumer information has likely started to change the way consumers search for cars. However, cars are likely an experience good, so websites could never fully inform a consumer completely about the utility from purchase like personal interaction can. Second, consumers may search in a more complicated way, nesting geographical concerns with the search for a dealer (as in Moraga-González et al. (2015) ) and the search for a car type. Thirdly, although we present a demand driven reason for dealers to co-locate, there are likely cost driven reasons, for example land prices, zoning, and management convenience for multi-dealership dealer conglomerates, among others. Our analysis can not be used to balance all the tradeoffs associated with the optimal location decision, only to quantify the demand side incentives.
Appendix A: Proof of the existence and uniqueness of the shares equation
In this appendix, we show the existence and uniqueness of the solution to s j = s j ( ) for all j. In the proof, we omit the subscript f and t. The existence comes from the Brouwer's fixed point theorem. We need to show that the value of has a lower bound and a upper bound. Define¯ j as the solution to P
We can show that s j ( ) ¯ j for all j. Define¯ = max{¯ j }. Define j as the solution to s j = s j ( ), where k = 1 for all k 6 = j. Define = min{ j }. Moreover, s are continuous functions. Therefore, according to the Brouwer's fixed point theorem, there must exist a fixed point. Next, we prove the uniqueness. First of all, let m j denote the area that product j locates in. For our model, we can write
o t h e r w i s e . and
o t h e r w i s e First of all,
m k is the set including both m j and m k and S m j /m k is the set including m j but not m k . Note: The sample includes 79,097 transactions and 2,280 model/dealer/year observations. Sample selection is detailed in the text. Price instruemnts include the difference in average characteristics of all nearby cars and nearby cars of the same style (within 5 and 10 miles). For the "distance in utility" specification the marginal utility of price is:
, where hi is income and &i is a standard normal random variable. Note: "all areas" refers to the total surplus change of all dealers in the sample including the closed dealer, "same area" refers to the total surplus change of all other dealers located in the same geographic area as the closed dealer, and "other areas" refers to the total surplus change of all dealers located in all geographic areas other than the area of the closed dealer. Note: "all areas" refers to the total surplus change of all dealers in the sample, "same area" refers to the total surplus change of all other dealers located in the same geographic area as the closed dealer, and "other areas" refers to the total surplus change of all dealers located in all geographic areas other than the area of the closed dealer. Note: All averages are weighted by the market shares. Difference = observed -predicted by full information model. The own price elasticities are measured in the absolute values.
